Park Jong-seung

North Korea's missile tests and weapons buildup escalate regional tensions

The author is a distinguished professor at Korea Aerospace University and former head of the Agency for Defense Development.

North Korea reaffirmed its dual-track strategy of advancing both nuclear and conventional forces at the recently-held Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea. The regime framed the modernization of conventional capabilities through defense science and technology not only as a means of strengthening military power but also as a core tool for ensuring regime stability and national survival.

In recent years, alongside the development of the Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear weapon, North Korea has accelerated the advancement of high-end conventional systems. These include hypersonic missile tests, sea-launched cruise missiles, air defense systems and unmanned aerial vehicles. The frequency of short-range ballistic missile launches has increased, while new weapons development has continued apace. By integrating a range of warheads such as electromagnetic pulse devices, cluster munitions, fragmentation mines, mine-dispensing shells and carbon fiber munitions into multiple platforms, Pyongyang is expanding both the threat level and operational diversity of its conventional forces.

Particular attention has been drawn to a test conducted in April under the observation of leader Kim Jong-un, in which short-range ballistic missiles equipped with cluster munitions or mine-dispensing warheads were demonstrated. The test showed North Korea's capability of dispersing multiple submunitions in midair, effectively neutralizing a wide area with a diameter of about 400 meters (1,312 feet) in a short period. It highlighted what could be described as an area-denial capability and suggested the possibility of saturating air defense systems by combining different weapon systems.

This development goes beyond a simple display of firepower. It points to an operational concept aimed at disabling key infrastructure early in a conflict, including runways, command and control systems, air defense assets and concentrated troop formations. The use of mobile launchers with multiple tubes and the simultaneous deployment of several platforms indicate an intent to overwhelm critical targets in the initial stages of war. Such weapons also carry the risk of causing civilian harm long after hostilities end, as unexploded submunitions can remain a persistent danger.

For this reason, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which entered into force in 2010, broadly prohibits the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of such weapons. However, the United States, Russia, North Korea and South Korea are not parties to the convention. For South Korea, openly justifying the retention of cluster munitions based on military utility alone is difficult, given the potential civilian harm, international criticism and postwar recovery burden associated with unexploded ordnance.

At the same time, in a security environment like the Korean Peninsula, where the situation could shift dramatically within hours of a conflict's onset, it is not easy to dismiss entirely the need for weapons capable of neutralizing wide-area targets quickly. As seen in recent conflicts such as those between Iran and Israel and between Russia and Ukraine, cluster munitions tend to reappear as situations become more urgent.

Discussion of such capabilities, therefore, should be limited to a narrow scope aimed at preventing gaps in deterrence. Their use, if considered at all, should be strictly confined to last-resort conditions while taking into account civilian risks and international norms. At the same time, efforts should focus on reducing submunition failure rates, developing low-cost and low-altitude air defense systems capable of intercepting munitions before dispersal and enhancing drone-based explosive ordnance disposal technologies.

In real security conditions, principles alone are insufficient. In times of crisis, the survival of the state and its people must take precedence. Maintaining a range of options while being prepared allows for the choice not to use certain means, whereas lacking options altogether creates structural constraints that limit response. In an environment of increasingly sophisticated asymmetrical threats, the latter risks creating gaps in deterrence.

The essential question is whether to secure and manage a broad set of response options in advance or to accept operating with limited means. Given the possibility that latent threats can rapidly become real, South Korea must prepare accordingly. As North Korea deepens military ties with Russia and continues to advance both nuclear and high-end conventional capabilities, the balance of conventional superiority is becoming harder to sustain. This underscores the urgency of developing creative and integrated next-generation defense capabilities that go beyond existing concepts.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.